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Resumo
Este artigo analisa, pela primeira vez na literatura, o impacto dos sindicatos de trabalhadores em vários 
indicadores de desempenho econômico de firmas industriais brasileiras. Realizou-se uma pesquisa ret-
rospectiva sobre a densidade sindical de 1000 estabelecimentos industriais brasileiros e seus resultados 
foram combinados aos indicadores de desempenho econômico da Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA) de 1990 
a 2000. Os resultados indicam que a relação entre a densidade sindical na firma e seus salários, emprego 
e produtividade, é não-linear, ou seja, um aumento no grau de sindicalização leva a um melhor desem-
penho, porém a taxas decrescentes. Observou-se, também, uma relação negativa entre sindicalização e 
rentabilidade. Finalmente, estabelecimentos que introduziram mecanismos de ‘participação nos lucros’ 
aumentaram sua produtividade e rentabilidade no período e pagaram maiores salários nas firmas onde o 
grau de sindicalização era maior. 
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abstRact
This paper examines, for the first time in the literature, the impact of trade unions on various performance 
indicators of Brazilian establishments. A unionism retrospective survey was carried out among 1,000 es-
tablishments in the manufacturing sector and its results were matched to performance indicators available 
from the Brazilian Industrial Surveys between 1990 and 2000. The results using the pooled data indicate 
that the relationship between unionism and some performance indicators, such as average wages, em-
ployment and productivity is non-linear (concave), so that a rise in unionism from low levels is associated 
with higher performance, but at a decreasing rate. Unions also reduce profitability. Establishments that 
introduced profit-sharing schemes increased their productivity and profitability overall and paid higher 
wages in more unionized plants.
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1. IntRoductIon
Economists have always been concerned about the impact of labor unions on eco-
nomic performance. Studies in the economics and industrial relations literature have 
examined the impact of union presence and density on several performance outcomes, 
measured at the plant, firm or industry level. These outcomes either reflect static 
performance, such as profitability and productivity, or dynamic efficiency, such as 
investments in physical capital and in R&D. 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) survey the evidence on the union wage mark-up in 
many countries and find that unions are able to raise wages by significant amounts in 
most cases. Metcalf (2003) summarizes the recent research on the impact of union-
ization on productivity, financial performance and investment in various countries 
and concludes that unions tend to reduce profits and harm financial performance in 
most cases. The effects of unionism on productivity, however, generally depend on 
the quality of management and trade unions, and on institutional aspects particular 
to each country.
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) summarize the evidence on the relationship 
between unions and various technology indicators. In the U.S. unions are associated 
with lower R&D, innovation and productivity growth, but in Europe the evidence 
is more mixed. In the UK, for example, the authors uncover a negative correlation 
between unionism and R&D spending in the U.K., but this correlation basically 
disappears when cohort dummies and technological opportunities are controlled for, 
giving way to a concave relationship between the two variables. The differences be-
tween the North-American and European studies could be related to the differences 
in institutions and in the scope of bargaining in the two regions.
In Latin America, there are very few econometric studies of the economic effect 
of unions, which is surprising given the importance of unions in shaping various 
economic and political outcomes in these countries. There have been some studies 
examining the effect of unions on wages, such as Arbache (1999), which finds that 
unions increase wage dispersion in Brazil, contrary to almost all studies in the devel-
oped world. This highlights the need for research on the effect of unions on economic 
performance in Latin America, so that a better understanding of the their role can be 
gained and economic policies devised to improve the relationship between workers 
and managers.
The union structure that has emerged from the 1988 Constitution is very curious. 
Because of the maintenance of both the “Union Contribution” and the union mo-
nopoly, there are many incentives to create new unions. At the same time, however, 
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union officers are still relatively insulated from rank-and-file pressures to represent 
workers’ interests. Figures from the Brazilian Labor Ministry indicate that there are 
about 18,000 unions in the country. It would incorrect to say that all are led by non-
representative, illegitimate officers. In fact, there is an important part of the Brazilian 
labor movement, within CUT (the largest national umbrella organization), which 
advocates the signing of Convention 87. Some Brazilian unions give back to the work-
ers they represent the dues collected by the government (the “Union Contribution”). 
Some unions fight to establish formal representation at the plant level, through work-
ers councils, and to establish direct negotiations with management.
All Brazilian laborers working in formally organized firms are formally represented 
by a trade union. The union engages in collective bargaining at least once a year. 
Bargaining outcomes are automatically extended to all workers in the industry, re-
gardless of the membership status of individual workers. However, trade unions do 
negotiate, on a plant-by-plant basis, about working conditions and practices, employ-
ment levels, shifts, introduction of new machinery, etc. Therefore, we will test the 
hypothesis that the wages and practices defined at the industry level act as a floor 
(outside option) for the workers’ demands within a plant, and that a second-round 
bargaining process takes place within each establishment that will affect various per-
formance indicators, depending on the relative bargaining power of its workers. The 
bargaining power depends on the union strength, which will be proxied here by 
union density, that is, the share of workers in each establishment that belongs to a 
trade union. 
In sum, trade unions have played a very important role in Brazilian society, espe-
cially in recent times, since the re-democratization process that took place in the 
early 1980s. Despite this important role played by unions in our society, there is not 
a single econometric study assessing the impact of unions on static and dynamic ef-
ficiency in Brazil. This paper aims at starting to fill this gap.
The aim of this paper is to investigate, for the first time in the literature, the impact 
of trade unions on several establishment performance indicators in Brazil. We use 
panel data at the plant level from the Brazilian industrial surveys, matched to our own 
questionnaire about union presence and industrial relations’ policies, to investigate the 
effects of unions on the employment, average wages, profitability and productivity of 
Brazilian establishments.
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2. EconoMEtRIc MEtHodology
In order to investigate the role of trade unions in Brazil, we estimate simple panel 
data econometric models such as:
	 it i it it it t itY Union Competition X= α + β +θ + γ +δ + ε 	 (1)
where i refers to an establishment observed in year t, Y is the dependent variable of 
interest (profitability, productivity, employment or wages), iα is the unobserved firm 
fixed effect, union is a proxy for union power (e.g. union density), competition proxies 
for local and foreign product market competition1, and the vector X represents econo-
metric controls potentially correlated with unionization and with performance indica-
tors, such as market share for example. 
Since we have panel data, there are many possible estimation strategies. Firstly, we 
pool the data over the years and estimate ordinary least squares models to have an 
idea of the magnitude of the union impact on different indicators of economic per-
formance in Brazil and compare them with available estimates in the developed and 
developing world. Following Menezes-Filho et al (1998), we also try to identify non-
linearities in the relationship between unionism and performance. Then, we split the 
sample and run separate regressions for the periods before and after the period of 
trade liberalization and economic stabilization, to check whether the coefficients on 
union density are stable over time.
In a second stage, we use the time-varying (retrospective) information on union den-
sity to estimate equation (1) in long-differences, to check whether the union impact 
estimated in the pooled sample is robust to the inclusion of plant-level fixed-effects. 
We then use the information on the introduction profit-sharing schemes, also gath-
ered by our survey, to check whether this policy has improved efficiency at the plant 
level and whether this effect differs according to union status.
In order to identify the effects of trade unions on several performance indicators we 
have to rely on the assumption that there are no omitted variables correlated with 
union density and with the performance indicators, conditionally on the other ex-
planatory variables and on the fixed effects (in the panel specifications). Therefore 
we have to be careful before attributing a causal interpretation to the regression coef-
ficients (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
1 In the survey we ask how many direct competitors the establishment faces in its main product 
market.
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3. tHE data
The data we use in this research come from two different sources. The next two sub-
sections describe the data.
3.1 annual Industrial survey (PIa)
The first source is the Brazilian Annual Industrial Survey (PIA), carried out between 
1988 and 2000 by the Brazilian census bureau (IBGE).2 Firms qualify for the PIA 
if at least half of their revenues stem from manufacturing activity and if they are 
formally registered with the Brazilian tax authorities. The PIA sample of firms was 
constructed from three layers: a non-random sample of the largest Brazilian manu-
facturers, plus a random sample of the medium firms and a non-random selection of 
newly founded firms. The average number of firms is 10,000 per year.3
The variables we use from the surveys are: payroll, fringe benefits, sales revenue, cost 
of raw materials and energy, value added, number of employees and capital stock. 
With these variables we constructed four performance indicators: Profitability, value 
added, Employment, and the average Wages (see the appendix for the description of 
the variables). 
3.2 union survey 
There is no information on unionism in the Industrial Surveys. Therefore, we pro-
ceeded as in Menezes-Filho et al (1998) and carried out our own (retrospective) survey 
among manufacturing firms. We surveyed 1,000 manufacturing plants from different 
regions, mainly of medium to large size in terms of employment. The interviews were 
conducted by telephone, which guaranteed a high response rate of around 95%. The 
establishments were asked about the percentage of workers that were unionized in 
2000, as well as about changes in union status between 1995-2000 (1990-1995) and 
about the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme. They were also asked about the 
degree of competition they faced in 2000 (1995), both locally and from abroad, and 
about changes in competition between 1995-2000 (1990-1995). The questionnaire 
is included in the appendix. We were able to match 285 of the surveyed plants to the 
Industrial Surveys conducted by IBGE.
2 No survey was conducted in 1991, for budget reasons. 
3 See Muendler (2004) for a detailed description of PIA.
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(1): 55-72, jan-mar 2008
60 trade unions and the Economic Performance of Brazilian Establishments 
Table 1 describes the main variables used in our empirical exercises. The data in our 
sample accord well with the stylized facts of the Brazilian economy in the 1990s. 
Productivity, profitability and real wages rose substantially between 1990 and 1993 
and fluctuated with the trade cycle afterwards. Many papers attribute the rise in the 
values of these variables to the trade liberalization process.4 Employment in manu-
facturing declined between 1990 and 1993 and continued to decline until the end of 
the sample period, so that the productivity gains were obtained by maintaining the 
production levels constant with a smaller workforce.
taBlE 1 – dEscRIPtIvE statIstIcs
Years Employment Real Wages Labor
Productivity
Profitability N
1990 990 860.57 55,681.46 0.29 229
(1488) (516,89) (70,836.19) (0.32)
1992 874 969.46 86,534.19 0.41 257
(1350) (596.65) (130,181.70) (0.27)
1993 850 1,058.23 92,123.06 0.40 258
(1219) (730.55) (114,284.90) (0.30)
1994 876 1,012.95 91,138.07 0.42 274
(1245) (681.88) (133,958.70) (0.23)
1995 838 1,170.82 69,189.29 0.26 265
(1135) (750.15) (101,222.90) (0.25)
1996 634 1,378.31 80,032.33 0.32 276
(891) (861.43) (108,138.40) (0.22)
1997 600 1,412.54 87,559.24 0.32 221
(910) (871.79) (119,748.00) (0.22)
1998 569 1,443.24 86,568.44 0.31 274
(891) (983.13) (115,925.60) (0.23)
1999 558 1,257.65 91,333.84 0.32 239
(937) (747.66) (134,067.10) (0.23)
2000 603 1,125.55 79,445.58 0.29 236
(1050) (718.19) (115,264.70) (0.29)
Average 740 1,170.94 82,167.77 0.34 2529
90-00 (1135) (781.53) (116,269.70) (0.26)
Source: annual Industrial survey (PIa) – IBgE. For definitions of the variables, see text. Standard 
Deviations are in brackets.
Table 2 tabulates the results of the survey in terms of union presence over our sample 
period. It shows that about half of the establishments have less than 25% of their 
4 See Ferreira and Rossi (2003) and Muendler (2004), for example.
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workforce unionized, with the other half split among the other quartiles of union 
density, which means that there is enough variation in union density to identify its 
effects on economic performance. With respect to changes over time, Table 3 shows 
that many firms experienced changes in union density amongst their employees, 
with 10% reporting a rise in union density between 1995 and 2000, 58% reporting 
stability and 32% reporting a reduction. The percentages between 1990 and 1995 
are similar to these.
taBlE 2 – unIon dEnsIty In 2000 
Density Frequency
Den <25% 50%
25%< Den <=50% 22.7%
50%< Den <=75% 13.4%
Den >75% 13.8%
Number of Firms 285
taBlE 3 – cHangEs In unIon dEnsIty 
1990-1995 1995-2000
Increase in Density 11.1% 9.9%
Constant Density 60.4% 57.8%
Decline in Density 28.4% 32.2%
Number of Firms 285 285
Table 4 compares the mean outcomes across establishments with different levels of 
unionization. In terms of employment and average wages, one can note that there is 
a non-linear (concave) relationship with the percentage of workers unionized in 2000. 
These variables tend to rise with unionization up to a certain level and decrease there-
after, while productivity and profitability decline continuously with unionization. 
taBlE 4 – avERagE PERFoRMancE By unIon dEnsIty
Variable Employment Wages Labor
Productivity
Profitability N
Den≤ 25% 530 1,103.47 88,649.54 0.35 1245
25%>Den≤50% 1099 1,399.25 83,385.46 0.35 589
50%>Den<=75% 1032 1,229.28 71,780.98 0.32 347
Den>75% 593 967.72 67,274.68 0.29 348
Source: annual Industrial survey (PIa) – IBgE. 
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4. tHE REsults
4.1 Pooled sample
Table 5 presents the results of the levels regressions, using the 1990-2000 pooled 
data. All models were estimated using a random-effects procedure, which takes into 
account the presence of serial correlation induced by persistent establishment-specific 
effects and a set of two-digit industry dummies. It is important to note that the union 
density variable is fixed in 2000, that is, it does not vary over time. Therefore, this 
variable in included to capture the strength of union power in the firm, and we as-
sume that this strength does not vary a lot over time.
taBlE 5 – lEvEls REgREssIons – 1990-2000
Controls Profitability Log
Employment
Log
Value Added
Log
Wages
Union Density -0.065** 0.305** -0.424*** 0.062
(0.031) (0.142) (0.140) (0.082)
Market Share 1.220*** 8.569*** 5.448*** 2.488***
(0.311) (0.768) (1.040) (0.473)
Concentration 0.034* 0.084 0.081 0.040
(0.019) (0.087) (0.085) (0.050)
Capital /Sales -1.158*** -2.935*** - -0.291
(0.334) (0.830) (0.500)
Ln(employment) 0.003 - 0.797*** -0.085***
(0.008) (0.034) (0.012)
Ln (capital) - - 0.246*** -
(0.032)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
N 2523 2523 2523 2523
Source: PIa – IBgE. Random-Effects Regression. Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in 
brackets. * Denotes statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
In the first column the results of the profitability regressions are set out, which shows 
that union density is negatively associated with it, even after controls are allowed 
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for market share, market concentration,5 employment, capital intensity and sector 
dummies. It is interesting to note that both market share and market concentration 
positively impact profitability, suggesting the importance of both the efficiency and 
the market power considerations in the Brazilian industry. 
In terms of employment, a positive and significant coefficient is reported in column 
(2), suggesting that unionized plants employ more people, even conditionally on 
market share, capital intensity and the sector dummies. In terms of value added, the 
results in column (3) indicate that more unionized plants produce less output, given 
the levels of employment and capital, than less unionized ones. It is also interesting 
to note that market share has a positive impact on productivity, but concentration 
does not, implying a cost-based interpretation for this market share effect. In terms 
of average wages, column (4) shows the impact of union density is positive but not 
significant at conventional levels. It is interesting to point out, however, that both 
market share and employment attract positive and significant coefficients in the wage 
equations. This provides evidence of a noncompetitive wage determination process, 
in particular of rent- sharing.
The models so far imposed the restriction that the relationship between unionization 
and performance is linear (or log-linear), but both the descriptive statistics presented 
in Table 4 and the results of Menezes-Filho et al (1998) suggest a non-linear rela-
tionship between union density and the performance indicators. Therefore, in Table 
 we include union density squared as an additional explanatory variable in all the 
specifications. The results of the random-effects specifications show that the non-
linear specification fits the data better in the cases of employment, value added and 
average wages, while it does not in the case of profitability.7 
taBlE 6 – lEvEls REgREssIons – non-lInEaR dEnsIty -1990-2000
Controls Profitability Employment Value Added Wages
Density 
0.050 2.590*** 0.464 1.366***
(0.107) (0.478) (0.483) (0.279)
Density Squared
-0.125 -2.515*** -0.970* -1.433***
(0.112) (0.503) (0.506) (0.293)
Source: PIa – IBgE. Random-Effects Regression. Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in 
brackets. All controls of Table 5 are included in the regressions. * Denotes statistically significant 
at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
5 The concentration measure we use is based on our survey. The managers were asked whether they face 
more than 5 competitors in their market (see appendix). 
 See Slade (2004).
7 The F-statistics (1,2800) were: 4.7 (profitability), 110.19 (employment), 11.31 (value added) and 
114.9 (wages).
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In the case of employment, the results imply that it increases up to a union density 
of about 50%, declining after that.8 Some unionism also seems to be good for the 
plants’ productivity, but when union density reaches about 30%, productivity starts 
to decline, and after 50% of the employees are unionized, productivity is lower on 
average than in non-unionized establishments. A similar phenomenon occurs with 
average wages, as the impact of unionism reaches its maximum when approximately 
half of the plant’s workforce is unionized and is actually lower than in non-unionized 
plants when all workers belong to a trade union.
One explanation consistent with these findings is that wages and employment depend 
on the plant’s performance, and the presence of trade unions facilitates, to a certain 
point, communication between workers and managers, increasing efficiency and pro-
ductivity (Freeman and Medoff, 1979). When unions have too much power, however, 
they impede the introduction of new technologies and lead to the deterioration of all 
performance indicators.
4.2 the union Effect over time
In a period of significant changes in the economic environment, it is important to 
test for the stability of the estimated coefficients over time. Brazil (like other Latin 
American countries) has been subject to many macroeconomic shocks in recent de-
cades. In the early 1990s a drastic trade liberalization process took place, with trade 
tariffs declining from an average of 57.5% in 1988 to about 15.% in 1995. Moreover, 
inflation in Brazil was very high and volatile in the beginning of the 1990s, before 
being drastically reduced by the “Real plan” introduced in 1994. 
In order to examine the stability of the union effect over time, we estimate O.L.S. 
regressions before and after the reforms, with the four performance indicators as de-
pendent variables. The results are presented in Table 7.9 Column (1) shows that that 
the estimated union impact on profitability differs substantially between the two pe-
riods. Before 1994, the coefficients of the union terms were statistically insignificant, 
while after stabilization a non-linear relationship between unionism and profitability 
emerges. One explanation consistent with this finding is that in periods of high and 
volatile inflation, relative prices fluctuate substantially, so that the bargaining pro-
cess between unions and management can always be solved through price hikes (see 
Amadeo, 1994). The non-linear relationships between employment and unionization 
and between average wages and union density, on the other hand, are quite stable over 
8 About 24% of plants have densities higher than that.
9 It must emphasized that we are using the union density in 2000 as the main independent variable in 
the regressions, but controls are included for the plants whose managers reported changes in density 
between 1990 and 2000.
naércio a. Menezes-Filho,  José Paulo chahad, Hélio Zylberstajn, Elaine toldo Pazello 65
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(1): 55-72, jan-mar 2008
time. With respect to value added, no clear relationship with union density is notice-
able before 1994, whereas after stabilization the non-linear pattern is also evident. 
taBlE 7 – tHE unIon EFFEct ovER tIME
Profitability Employment Value Added Wages
1990-1994
Density
-0.203 1.848*** -0.217 1.275***
(0.154) (0.616) (0.526) (0.311)
Density2
0.156 -1.655*** -0.148 -1.307***
(0.161) (0.651) (0.550) (0.327)
1995-2000
Density
0.213 2.990*** 0.919 1.266***
(0.120) (0.521) (0.604) (0.294)
Density2
-0.294 -3.019*** -1.474** -1.353***
(0.126) (0.547) (0.631) (0.308)
Note: source: PIa – IBgE; Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in brackets. All controls of 
Table 5 are included in the regression. * Denotes statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the 
.05 level; ***at the .01 level.
4.3 long-differences Equations
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of regressions that use the change in union density10 
as the main explanatory variable for the changes in the performance measures over 
1995-2000 and 1990-1995, respectively. The aim of these exercises is to examine the 
robustness of the previous results to the control of the plant-specific time-invariant 
fixed-effects. The results of Table 8 show that the estimates tend to have very large 
standard errors, so that most of the union effects were imprecisely estimated. An 
important exception is the positive impact of the reduction in union density between 
1995-2000 on productivity growth, which is in line with the levels’ results. It is also 
important to point out the positive impact of the rise in competition, both from for-
eign and local producers, on profitability and productivity, and the positive effect of 
market share on productivity.
The standard errors in Table 9 also tend to be large, but the negative impact of the 
rise in union density between 1990-1995 on profitability growth is precisely estimat-
ed. The positive effect of the rise in foreign competition on employment growth and 
its negative effect on average wages are also worth highlighting. Changes in market 
share again positively affect employment, productivity and wages, which reinforces 
10 As reported by the manager that answered the survey. The omitted variable is “constant union density” 
throughout.
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the results obtained in the levels specifications. The large standard errors could be 
the result of measurement errors, which are magnified in differences specification 
(Freeman, 1984), and the effects of trade unions are notoriously difficult to be cap-
tured in first-differences specifications (see Hirsch, 1991 and Bronars, Deere and 
Tracy, 1994).
taBlE 8 – long –dIFFEREncEs: 2000-1995
∆ 
Profitability
∆ 
Employment
∆
Value Added
∆
 Wages
Rise in Density
0.112* 0.149 0.339 -0.127
(0.065) (0.181) (0.306) (0.104)
Decline in Density
0.066 -0.076 0.337** -0.024
(0.046) (0.118) (0.166) (0.052)
Rise in Local Competition
0.071 0.045 0.237 0.045
(0.061) (0.325) (0.160) (0.134)
Constant Local Competition
0.036 0.061 0.424** 0.083
(0.064) (0.330) (0.171) (0.139)
Rise in Foreign Competition
0.243** -0.046 0.360 0.101
(0.098) (0.202) (0.273) (0.115)
Constant Foreign Competi-
tion
0.282*** 0.091 0.494* 0.103
(0.095) (0.215) (0.266) (0.118)
∆ Market Share
1.265 6.487** 6.546* 1.990
(1.049) (3.089) (3.827) (1.309)
∆ Employment
0.021 - 0.967*** 0.001
(0.025) (0.104) (0.041)
∆Capital/Sales
-1.395 -5.197 - -1.489
(1.161) (1.687) (1.426)
∆ Capital
- - 0.054 -
(0.050)
N 219 219 219 219
Note: source: PIa – IBgE; Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in brackets. * Denotes statisti-
cally significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
naércio a. Menezes-Filho,  José Paulo chahad, Hélio Zylberstajn, Elaine toldo Pazello 67
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(1): 55-72, jan-mar 2008
taBlE 9 – long –dIFFEREncEs: 1995-1990
∆
Profitability
∆
Employment
∆
Value Added
∆
Wages
Rise in Density
-0.155** 0.083 -0.094 0.065
(0.069) (0.091) (0.216) (0.081)
Decrease in Density
-0.018 -0.059 -0.031 0.128**
(0.056) (0.067) (0.151) (0.063)
Rise in Local Competition
0.009 0.209 -0.080 0.025
(0.077) (0.189) (0.234) (0.135)
Constant local Competition
0.082 0.161 0.054 -0.022
(0.079) (0.189) (0.228) (0.137)
Rise in Foreign Competition
-0.103 0.293** -0.403 -0.297***
(0.128) (0.087) (0.324) (0.106)
Constant Foreign
Competition
-0.081 0.347*** -0.399 -0.313**
(0.128) (0.110) (0.308) (0.112)
∆ Market Share
1.331 2.132* 6.677** 3.578***
(1.542) (1.176) (2.767) (0.932)
∆Employment
0.005 0.342 -0.338***
(0.059) (0.142) (0.086)
∆Capital/Sales
-1.397 1.656 - -1.235
(1.318) (1.156) (1.275)
∆Capital
- - -0.029 -
(0.052)
N 218 218 216 218
Note: source: PIa – IBgE; Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in brackets. * Denotes statisti-
cally significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
taBlE 10 - PRoFIt sHaRIng: long dIFFEREncEs - 2000-1995
∆  
Profitability
∆  
Employment
∆ 
Value Added
∆ 
Wages
Introduction of
Profit Sharing
0.102** 0.169 0.283* 0.024
(0.040) (0.117) (0.158) (0.055)
Source: PIa – IBgE; Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in brackets. All controls of Table 
9 are also included. * Denotes statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the 
.01 level.
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4.4 the Introduction of Profit sharing
The managers of the establishments were also asked about the introduction of profit-
sharing schemes, which was officially permitted by labor legislation in 1995. The 
results in Table 11 indicate that the introduction of profit sharing is associated with a 
rise in all performance indicators, with statistically significant effects on profitability 
and productivity. The results must be interpreted with caution, however, since we 
do not know the exact year when the policy was introduced, so that it is difficult to 
attribute a causal interpretation to these relationships, which should be seen as pre-
liminary findings.
taBlE 11 - PRoFIt sHaRIng and unIonIZatIon - long dIFFEREncEs 
- 2000-1995
∆  
Profitability
∆  
Employment
∆ 
Value Added
∆ 
Wages
Union Density -0.033 -0.219 0.012 -0.197
(0.105) (0.284) (0.525) (0.152)
Introduction of
Profit Sharing 
0.066 0.237 0.191 -0.116
(0.056) (0.159) (0.221) (0.085)
Profit Sharing *  
Union Density
0.105 -0.167 0.254 0.412**
(0.153) (0.353) (0.626) (0.187)
Source: PIa – IBgE; Standard Errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) are in brackets. All controls of table 
9 are also included. * Denotes statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the 
.01 level.
It is possible that the effects of the introduction of profit sharing depend on the 
degree of unionization in the establishment (see Black and Lynch, 2001, for some 
evidence along this line for the U.S.). The results of Table 11 show that this occurred 
with average wages, so that more unionized firms had a trajectory of lower wages 
on average than less unionized ones, but this was counterweighted in the unionized 
firms that introduced profit sharing schemes.
5. conclusIons
The results from this paper indicate that unions seem to affect the economic perfor-
mance of Brazilian establishments, in terms of profitability, employment, productivity 
and average wages. The results using the pooled sample suggest that unions tend to 
reduce profitability, whereas the relationship between union density and productivity, 
employment and average wages seems to be concave. These performance indicators 
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first rise with union density up to a certain density level (usually about 50%) and then 
start to decline. These results indicate that some unionism may be good for the plants’ 
economic performance, although too much unionism may have negative effects.
It seems that the union effect on profitability and productivity changed after the 
economic reforms introduced in the early 1990s, but the union impacts on wages and 
employment were quite stable over time. The union effects on profitability and pro-
ductivity growth were also observed in long-differences specifications, which control 
for establishment fixed-effects.
There is also evidence that the introduction of profit-sharing schemes was associated 
with an improvement in performance, both in terms of productivity and profitabil-
ity. This impact was no different among unionized firms, but profit sharing only 
improved average wages in more unionized establishments.
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aPPEndIx 1. QuEstIonnaIRE
Company Name: _______________________________________________
Address: ______________________________________________________
State: ID: ____________________________________________________
Phone: Fax: ___________________________________________________
Contact:_____________  Position: _______________  E -mail: __________
Sector of Activity _______________________________________________
FIPE is conducting a survey to investigate the impact of trade unions on the economic 
performance of Brazilian Firms. The main aim is to verify the changes that may have taken 
place in the relationship between workers (trade unions) and firms after the trade liberaliza-
tion process that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. You will notice that some of 
the questions refer to three points in time: 1988, 1995 and 2000. We realize that it may 
take some time and effort for you to check the data to reply accurately. We thank you for 
this and assure you that all information will be treated confidentially and that you will gain 
access to the final results from April 2001 through the site (www.fipe.com/mediar).
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QuEstIonnaIRE
1. When was this establishment set up?
_Before 1990
_Between 1990 and 1995
_After 1995
2. How many employees did this establishment have in December 2000?
3. Between 1995 and 2000 (1990 and 1995) did the number of employees:
_Decline
_Stay the same
_Rise
4. In December 2000 what percentage of your employees were trade union 
members?
5. Between 1995 and 2000 (1990-1995) did the percentage of union membership:
_Decline
_Stay the same
_Rise
6. Does this establishment have a profit sharing scheme?
_No
_Yes. Introduced between 1995 and 2000? 
7.	 How many direct competitors does this establishment face in the product mar-
ket? 
_None
_Fewer than 5
_More than 5
8. Did the competition from local producers between 1995 and 2000 (1990-1995):
_Decline
_Stay the same
_Rise
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9. Did the competition from foreign producers between 1995 and 2000 
(1990-1995):
_Decline
_Stay the same
_Rise
aPPEndIx 2. constRuctIon oF PERFoRMancE vaRIaBlEs
Profitability: Total sales revenue (appropriately deflated) minus the cost of raw ma-
terials. capital depreciation and energy and other inputs.
Productivity: Total sales revenue (appropriately deflated) minus the cost of raw ma-
terials. capital depreciation and energy and other inputs.
Employment: Total number of employees in December of each year.
Average	Wages: Amount paid in monthly wages and salaries divided by the total 
number of employees. 
